Editors/Notes by Editors,
May, X94z
University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly, November to June, by the University of Pernsylvania Law
School. Copyright 1941, by the University of Pennsylvania
$4.50 PER ANNUM FOREIGN, $5.00 CURRENT COPIES, 75 CENTS
BOARD OF EDITORS
LI.MAN REDMAN, Editor-in-Chief
JOHN R. McCoNNELu Case Editor
BERNARD J. SMOLflNs, Secretarl
DAVID BE BANN
S. LzsTEa BLOCK
MARVIN COMISKY
EDWARD E. DAvW
RICHARD 3. FARRELL
CHESTER C. HILINSI
WILLIAM T. LErITr
PETZR P. LIAEERT, III
PZtER F. PUOLISN
LEONAI SARNER
EDWYN H. SILVERBERa
JOHN 1. SPURCEOX
JOHN X. STOCKER
Roy J. WATCHOFIP J.
WILLIAM F. LiNoaN~ti, Managing Editor
SAmUEL S. LOOAN, JR.. Legislation and
Note Editor
GEORM B. Ross, Book Review Editor
NORMAN H-. ABRAHAMSON
l-aIEDZRIC L BAU.ARA JI.
JzAx P. J. BALTZZLL
WILLIAM N. CLARK3
Louzs M. COHEN
JOHN A. EICuMAN, 3RD
G. NEWTON GREENN
NATHAN B. HALL
NORMAN T. HAYES, J.
DAVID AI=ANDE K-2
A. LEo LrviN
ROBERT E. NZWCOMB. J.
HERMAN B. RODo2S
SAMUEL P. SHAW, J.
JOSEPH W. SWAIN, J.
Correspondence concerned with editorial matters should be directed to the DIToa-
FN-CHznx; address business inquiries to the SxcRETARr.
NOTES
Service of Process Under the Reorganization Acts
I. PRIOR TO THE REORGANIZATION ACTS
A. Federal Equity Receiverships
Prior to the reorganization acts,' a partial solution of the problem of
how to continue rather than liquidate insolvent corporations was found in
i. Section 77, 47 STAT. 1474 (i933), amended in 1935, 49 STAT. 911 (935), 1I
U. S. C. A. §205 (I939) ; Section 77B, 48 STAT. 912 (1934), superseded by Chapter X
in 1938, 52 STAT. 883 (1938), Ixi U. S. C. A. §§ 501-676 (1939).
(96o)
NOTES
the utilization of federal equity receiverships.2 Since a federal court con-
ducting an equity receivership has no jurisdiction over property of the
debtor outside its district,s except to the limited extent provided by Section
56 of the Judicial Code,4 ancillary proceedings are necessary in every dis-
trict in which the debtor has property.5 Likewise, service of process cannot
be had beyond the territorial limits of the court's jurisdiction, except to the
limited extent provided by Section 56. By virtue of that section, process
may extend to the borders of the judicial circuit where the subject of the
suit consists of land or other fixed property extending, as a unit, into two
or more districts in the same circuit.8
B. Bankruptcy
By the terms of the Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy courts are giveri jur-
isdiction within their respective territorial limits.7 This has been expanded
by judicial decision to give the ordinary bankruptcy court the exclusive jur-
isdiction over property in the possession of the debtor wherever located.8
As to the mode of exercising this control, the bankruptcy court may proceed
summarily 9 with respect to the property in the actual or constructive pos-
session of the debtor,' 0 but not with respect to that which is held by third
parties under a bona fide claim of ownership. With respect to such adversely
claimed and held property, a plenary suit "I is necessary to decide whether
it is to be considered a part of the debtor's estate.1' And; by Section 23,
all suits against adverse claimants, except for the recovery of property under
Sections 6o, 67, and 7o, are to be brought in the courts where the debtor
might have brought them, unless the defendant consents to the contrary.23
2. FINLErrER, Tim LAW OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION (1939) I-Ig; Israels,
Sone Problems of Policy and Procedure in the Conduct of Reorganization Proceed-
ings (940) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 63, 65.
3. E. g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 7th, 3932).
4. 36 STAT. 1102 (x9), 28 U. S. C. A. 1 x7 (927). "Where in any suit in
which a receiver shall be appointed the land or other property of a fixed character, the
subject of the suit, lies within different States in the same judicial circuit, the receiver
so appointed shall, upon giving bond as required by the court, immediately be vested
with full jurisdiction and control over all the property, the subject of -he suit, lying
or being within such circuit. .... .
5. FINLErtR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 17O; Friendly, Some Comments on the Cor-
porate Rcorganications Act (1934) 48 HARV. L REv. 39, 46.
6. See note 4 supra. "In any case coming within the provisions of this section, in
which a receiver shall be appointed, process may issue and be executed within any
district of the circuit in the same manner and to the same extent as if the property
were wholly within the same district...." 36 STAT. 11o2 (xgii), 28 U. S. C. A.
HII7 (1927).
7. 52 STAT. 842 (1938), x U. S. C. A. § ii (Supp. 194o). "The courts of the
United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy are hereby created courts
of bankruptcy *and are hereby invested, within their respective territorial limits as
now established or as they may be hereafter changed, with such jurisdiction at law
and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under
this Act...
8. E. g., Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734 (1931), (1932) 8o
U. or PA. L. Rv. 412, (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 445. See x COLLIER ozq BANKRUTCY
(14th ed. 1940) 163.
9. Fm.E'rir , op. cit. supra note 2, at 156.
io. Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S. i02 (1gio) ; Staunton v. Wooden, x79 Fed. 6z
(C. C. A. 9th, 1gt1).
ii. See note 9 supra.
12. Courtney v. Shea, 225 Fed. 358 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) ; In re Eddy, 279 Fed.
99 (W. D. N. Y. 1922); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Johnson, 275 Fed.
112 (E. D. Mich. 1921). With respect to the application of Section 23, see note 13
infra.
13. 52 STAT. 854 (1938), i U. S. C. A. § 46 (Supp. x94o). "The United States
district courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and in equity, as
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This means that, except for recovery of property under Sections 6o, 67, and
70,14 absent consent a bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction to hear suits
against adverse claimants; but rather, the right is in the state courts, unless
the federal court would have had jurisdiction of the suit absent bankruptcy.1 '
Generally speaking, a bankruptcy court cannot issue extraterritorial
process.*" Hence ancillary proceedings are necessary in dealing with per-
sons outside the district.IT  There are situations, however; when process
will run outside the terfitorial jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Prior
to the passage of the Federal Rules of Procedure process could be extended
by some applicable federal statute,' 8 and after passage, in certain situations
by the Rules themselves.' 9 It is conceded that nationwide service of process
is possible in straight bankruptcy since Congress could make the jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court co-extensive with the geographical borders of
the United States, 20 and since courts could make use of Section 2 (15),21 to
distinguished from proceedings under this Act, between receivers and trustees as such
and adverse claimairts, concerning the property acquired or claimed by the receivers
or trustees, in the same manner and to the same extent as though such proceedings
had not been instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and
such adverse claimants.
"(b) Suits by the receiver and the trustee sh..ll be brought or prosecuted only in
the courts where the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings
under this Act had not been instituted, unless by consent of the defendant, except as
provided in Sections 6o, 67, and 70 of this Act."
x4. §6o (b), 52 STAT. 869 (1938), i U. S. C. A. §96 (Supp. 1940); §67 (e), 54
STAT. - (14o), ii U. S. C. A. § 107 (SUpp. 1940) ; § 70 (e) 3, 52 STAT. 879 (1938),
ii U. S. C. A. § iio (Supp. 1940). "For the purpose of any recovery or avoidance
." under 6o (b) (voidable preference), 67 (d) (fraudulent conveyance), and 70 (e)
(a transfer, which under any Federal or State law is fraudulent as against or voidable
by any creditor of the bankrupt), ". . . where plenary proceedings are necessary, any
state court which would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any
court of bankruptcy shall have concurrent jurisdiction."
15. F L~r=R-, op. cit. supra note 2, 179, I8o.
16. E. g., Orinoco Iron Co. v. Metzel, 23o Fed. 40 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); Staunton
v. Wooden, 179 Fed. 61 (C. C. A. 9th, igio).
17. I COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 165. Ancillary proceedings are necessary
. to affect a sale of real estate lying outside the district, to direct the delivery
of the bankrupt's assets located in another district, or to enjoin a non-resident from
suing in anothr jurisdiction where he was not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding,
unless the non-resident has been properly served within the district of the forum."
8. E. g., 42 STAT. 848 (1922), 28 U. S. C. A. § 654 (1928). "Until September 19,
i9-S, subpoenas for witnesses who are required to attend a court of the United States,
in any district, may run into any other district: Providcd. That in civil cases no writ
of subpoena shall issue for witnesses living out of the district in which the court is
held at a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place of holding the same
without the permission of the court being first had upon proper application and cause
shown." See i COLuFR, op. cit. mtpra note 8, at 166.
19. FED. RuLEs CIV. PROC. §45 (e): "() At the request of any party subpoenas
for attendance at a hearing or trial shall be issued by the clerk of the district court
for the district in which the hearing or trial is held. A subpoena requiring the attend-
ance of a witness at a hearing or trial may be served at any place within the district,
or at any place without the district that is within ioo miles of the place of the hearing
or trial specified in the subpe'ia; and, when a statute of the United States provides
therefor, the court upon proper application and cause shown may authorize the service
of a subpoena at any other place."
§ 4 (f) : "All process other than a suhpoena may be served anywhere within the
territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute of
the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state. A subpoena
may be served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45.'
See x CoLmER, op. cit. suPra note 8, at 167-169.
2o. "There were no legal obstacles to Congress' making the jurisdiction of the
court of bankruptcy co-extensive witl1 the territorial boundaries of the United States."
Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 72 F.
(2d) 443, 450 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
21. 30 STAT. 545 (1898), as amended 44 Stat. 662 (1926), as amended 52 STAT.
842 (1938), xx U. S. C. A. § ii (Supp. i94o). The courts of bankruptcy are in-
NOTES
achieve this end.2 However, the desirability of such a step is questionable
in view of the burden placed upon defending parties by compelling them to
appear in the bankruptcy court, oftentimes far away, and the lack of neces-
sity for such centralized action in a proceeding primarily concerned with
the liquidation of assets.
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDER THE REORGANIZATION AcTs
A. Section 77
In 1933, Section 77,28 dealing exclusively with the reorganization of
interstate railroads, was added to the Bankruptcy Act. This section gave
the reorganization court the exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its
property wherever located, 2' that is, the same jurisdictional power over
property as was given to the bankruptcy court by judicial decision.25 With
respect to the exercise of this power, the reorganization court has a wider
control than the equity or bankruptcy courts since its summary jurisdiction
extends beyond property in the actual or constructive possession of the
debtor and includes the power to dispose of assets within the-possession of
lienholders.26 As in bankruptcy, a bona fide claim of ownership accom-
paniea by possession will entitle such adverse claimant to a plenary suit.s2
Since Congress did not expressly exempt Section 23 of the Bankruptcy
Act 21 from Section 77 as it did in the case of the later-enacted Chapter X,29
the question arises as to whether a reorganization court acting under 77 has
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of adverse claims. Section 23 has "oeen
held applicable, 0 with the result that the reorganization court acting under
77 has no jurisdiction to hear adverse claims and determine what property
shall come under the control of mne bankruptcy court. However, such a
holding is not conclusive, and if the 1935 Amendment to the jurisdictional
section of 77 " be literally construed to allow nationwide service-of process,
a contrary decision would not be surprising.- Such a result would permit
vested ". . . with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to
exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act . . . to . . . (is) Make
such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in addition to those
srecifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of
this Act...."
22. The Supreme Court chose to use § 2 (15) in corporate reorganizations, as
was done in the Rock Island case (see note 36 infra), and not to use it in straight
bankruptcy. Conceivably, § 2 (1s) could have been utilized in a similar manner in such
a case as the Isaacs case (see note 8 supra), to enjoin an extraterritorial mortgagee from
foreclosing after bankruptcy, possession being in the bankruptcy court.
23. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), ameaded in 1935, 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U. S. C. A.
§20S (1939).
24. "If the petition is so approved, the court in which such order approving the
petition is entered shall, during the pendency of the proceedings under this section and
for the purposes thereof, have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property
wherever located. . . ." 47 STAT. 1474 (1933). This provision was unchanged by
the 1935 Amendment to Section 77. 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 1i U. S. C. A. § 205 (1939).
25. See note 8 supra.
26. F11;L,.rrkR, op. cit. ju:tra note 2, at 162.
27. Profescor Finletter tak,.s the view that the rights of a bona ide adverse
claimant should bd decided in -a rli-nary suit even when ph.vsical possession happens
to be in the debtor. FINLE rF., op. cit. supra note 2, at 163.
28. See note 13 supra.
29. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), it U. S. C. A. §so2 (1939).
30. See Thompson v. Terminal Shares. Inc., m04 F. (2d) 1, 9 (C. C. A. 8th,
7939), ccrt. deni ed, 308 U. S. 559 (T939) ; Note (194o) 49 YALE L J. 568.
31. See note 46 infra. "Process of the court shall extend and be valid when
served in any district."
32. See Note (x94o) 49 YALE L. J. 568.
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the issuance of extraterritorial service of process upon bona fide adverse
claimants in possession, in those plenary suits in which, in the court's dis-
cretion, the value of centralized control in a railroad reorganization out-
weighs the expense and inconvenience caused to the adverse claimant in
app a ng before the reorganization court.
As in the case of straight bankruptcy, no provision was made in Sec-
tion 77 as originally enacted for service of process beyond the territorial
limits of the court's jurisdiction. By virtue of the provision giving the
reorganizing court the exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property
wherever located, 8 the Supreme Court in the much-discussed Rock Island
case 84 concluded that the reorganizing court's process could issue through-
out the United States in a summary proceeding to enjoin an interference
with the debtor's property," thus eliminating the necessity for ancillary
proceedings. Whether the question of service of process should arise only
at the time the injunction is sought to be enforced (contempt proceedings),
construing the injunction as merely notice of the reorganization court's
jurisdiction over the debtor's property, or whether it should arise upon the
initial issuance of an injunction, is merely a question of degree, the impor-
tant point being: Can the reorganization court issue extraterritorial service
of process to prevent interferences, or must it resort to ancillary proceed-
ings to gain jurisdi-tion? Which question was resolved, as stated, in favor
of extraterritorial service of process in the Rock Island case. In that case,
specific extraterritorial pledgees of collateral, with powers of sale, were
enjoined from disposing of same under the power granted in Section
2 (15),36 the court treating the debtor's equity in the pledged collateral as
property of the debtor, 7 and hence with;n the territorial jurisdiction of the
reorganization court under Section 77.88 This result was reached despite
the generally accepted rule to the effect that a pledgee in possession could
not be restrained from selling pledged securities.39 In inferring such a
power of extraterritorial service of process in a summary proceeding to
prevent an interference with the debtor's property, the court was moved
primarily by a desire to protect the public interest involved in the continued
operation of a railroad,'0 the accomplishment of which necessitated the
elimination of ancillary proceedings and the speedy issuance of a stay order
33. See note 24 su~'?O
34. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. Ry., 94 U. S. 6.18 (r935), 35 Co.. L RFv. io9, 48 HAv. L. REV. x430,
33 MicH . L. Rzv. 1264. See Notes (1935) 13 N. C. L Rzv. 204, 44 YALE L. J. 677.
35. "Jurisdiction over the property wherever located carries with it jurisdiction to
enjoin, in a proper case, interferences with the property, and this includes, by necessary
inference, the power to send process to that end for service upon the persons to be en-
joined wherever they may be found within the United States." Continental Illinois
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 294 U. S. 648,
683 (193s).
36. See note 2o supra. "The bankruptcy court, in granting the injunction, was well
within its power, either as a virtual court of equity, or under the broad provisions of
§ z (15) of the Bankruptcy Act or of § 262 of the Judicial Code." Continental Illinois
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 294 U. S. 648,
676 (,935).
37. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pac. Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 68I (1935).
3A See note 24 supra.
39. Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 2o6 U. S. 28 (1907) ; In re Hudson River Nay. Cor-
poration, 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). Contra: In re Henry, So F. (2d) 453
(E. D. Pa. 193r), (1932) go U. OP PA. L Rrv. 123.
40. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pac. Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 671 (x935).
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f'om one court binding upon all extraterritorial pledgees.' 1 To have per-
mitted the sale of the pledged securities in the Rock Island case would have
meant a great increase in the outstanding funded indebtedness of the debtor
and the possible number of dissenting creditors, thereby seriously affecting,
if not making impossible, an-effective reorganization."
Such nationwide service of process to protect interferences with the
debtor's property as concluded in the Rock Island case is subject to the
argument that oftentimes the person enjoined cannot contest the order
before the reorganization court without going to great expense and incon-
venience." Such an argument would seem to carry little weight in a sum-
mary proceeding where delays necessitated by ancillary administrations
might be costly. Especially would this be true in a railroad reorganization
where public interest demands the continued operation of such a quasi-
public corporation, in contradistinction to the lack of such a demand for
the continuance of an ordinary corporation. On the other hand, whether
the reorganizing court under 77 may issue process extraterritorially to gain
plenary jurisdiction over adverse claimants was not answered by the Rock
Island case," nor was the applicability of Section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act
to Section 77 discussed. With respect to such plenary suits, the view is
more strongly taken that the burden of compelling an adverse claimant to
defend his claim in the reorganization court, oftentimes far away, with a
possible disregard of local rights, clearly outweighs the advantages of cen-
tralized administration and elimination of costly ancillary proceedings.'8
Immediately following the Rock Island decision, Section 77 was
amended to read that, "Process of the court shall extend and be valid when
served in any district". 46 A literal reading would seem to indicate that in
a railroad reorganization under Section 77, process may now issue extra-
territorially not only in a summary proceeding to prevent an interference
with the debtor's property, but also to gain plenary jurisdiction over adverse
claimants. However, such has not been the interpretation placed upon the
T935 Amendment.' 7 In Thompson v. Terminal Shares," the court in effect
held that under a proper construction of the jurisdictional provision of Sec-
tion 77 as amended, extraterritorial service of process could not issue to
gain plenary jurisdiction over adverse claimants.49 Actually, the reorgan-
ization court was held not to have jurisdiction over a plenary suit in equity
by the trustee to recover trust estate funds paid by the debtor to the defend-
ants prior to the filing of the petition for reorganization, where the defend-
ants asserting adverse claims to the funds in question were served outside
the district of the reorganization court. The court was of the opinion that
the intention of Congress in adopting the Amendment was that a reorgan-
ization court could serve a defendant with process in any judicial district
41. Id. at 683.
42. Debtor and its subsidiaries had pledged approximately $54.ooo,ooo in mortgage
bonds to secure approximately $i8,,ooooo of obligations. See (1935) 35 CoL L. RaV.
109, 11.
43. See Note (io.6) 49 HAv. L. Ray. 797, 80T.
44. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pac. Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 681 (1935).
45. Fi mrr..r-,a, op. cit. supra note 2. at 17&
46. 49 STAT. 911 (z935), 1! U. S. C. A. §205 (1939).
47. i COLT.TFR. oP. cit supra note 8, at 163, n. r. "This (1935 Amendment), how-
ever, may not be as broad as a literal reading would indicate."
18. See Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., 104 F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 8th, 1939),
cert. dh';,d. 30. U. S. 559 (r939) ; Note (1940) 49 YALF L. J. 568.
49. Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., 104 F. (-d) f, 9 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).cert. L-wr.,d, 309 U. S. 559 (7939).
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with respect to the prevention of interferences with property in the actual
or constructive possession of the debtor at the time of the filing of the peti-
tion, and act summarily to prevent such, but not -with respect to property
claimed for the trust estate in the possession of adverse claimants under
substantial claims of ownership, whose rights are to be determined in a
plenary suit."" As construed by the Thompson case, the 1935 Amend-
ment ' has little if any effect beyond a mere codification of the Rock Island
situation wherein the court may act summarily and issue process extrater-
ritorially to prevent interferences with that property of the debtor which
comes under the jurisdiction of the railroad reorganization court. This
would seem to be a narrow construction of an otherwise clearly expressed
intent.52 Against the broader interpretation of permitting extraterritorial
service of process in plenary suits, is the argument based upon inconve-
nience and unreasonable expense to the adverse claimant, as well as a pos-
sible disregard of local rights." However, the validity of this argument as
a determinative factor has been questioned in view of the fact that "there
are very few suits brought by railroads or their trustees on small claims"."
The solution would seem to lie in the recognition of the fact that extrater-
ritorial service of process is not mandatory under the 1935 Amendment,
but rather a matter of discretion with the reorganization court as to whether
such process should issue in a particular case. 5 Hence, in fhose cases in
which inconvenience to the person outside the district clearly outweighs the
objectives of centralized administration and the elimination of ancillary pro-
ceedings, process need not issue. And at the same time, process may issue
extraterritorially in a summary action or plenary suit (provided Section
23 is held to be inapplicable to Section 77), under the authority of the
1935 Amendment if reorganization demands outweigh the inconveniences
of those desiring to contest.
The court in the Thompson case was of the opinion that Section 23
should apply to Section 77, 6 thereby refusing to reorganization courts
under 77 jurisdiction over suits against adverse claimants. This is a logical
holding if the 1935 Amendment 5 is to be construcd as not extending extra-
territorial service of process to adverse claimants. However, if the Amend-
ment is to be construed literally and thus to allow extraterritorial service
of process upon adverse claimants in plenary suits, the jurisdiction of the
reorganization court would seem to extend beyond Section 23 and include
adverse claims. This view is strengthened by the fact that the 1935 Amend-
ment is, upon its face, inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act,"s and hence
should prevail. It is to he remembered, however, that even if the Amend-
ment is interpreted literally to permit the issuance of nationwide service of
process, and Section 23 is held inapplicable, the balance of conveniences
will still be taken into consideration by the court, which, in its discretion,
will decide whether such process shall issue or not.
50. Ibid.
Sr. See note 46 supra.
52. See Note (i94o) 49 YALE L J. 568, 571 et seq.
53. See note 45 supra.
54. Note (1940) 49 YALE. J. 568, 573.
55. FiNLETTER, op. cit. supra note 2, at i8a.
56. See note 30 supra.
57. See note 46 supra.
58. 49 STAT. 922 (1935), 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (1) (939) : "In proceedings under
this section (77) and consutent ith the provirions thereof, the jurisdiction and powers
of the court, the duties V' the debtor and the rights and liabilities of creditors, and of
all persons with respect to the debtor and its property, shall be the same as if a volun-
tary petition for adjudication had been filed and a decree of adjudication had been en-
tered on the day when the debtor's petition was filed." (Italics added.)
NOTES
B. Section 77B
In '934, Section 77B, providing relief for insolvent corporations was
added to the Bankruptcy Act.8 9 By virtue of this section, the reorganiza-
tion court was granted exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property
wherever located,"" that is, the same jurisdictional grant of power over
property as was given to the bankruptcy court by judicial decision,"1 and
to the railroad reorganization court by Section 77.' This jurisdiction could
be exercised in a summary fashion to prevent interferences with the debtor's
property, but not to determine ownership to property held under a bona
fide adverse claim, a plenary suit being required in such case. 8 The view
was taken that Section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act did apply to 7 7B,6
4 thereby
refusing to reorganization courts acting under 77B, jurisdiction over suits
against adverse claimants.
With respect to the questions of process, no provision was made for
service of process beyond the territorial limits of the court's jurisdiction.
However, in the Greyling Really Corp. case,8 5 where a receiver had been
appointed for the debt6r's prcperty 13 months before the reorganization
petition was filed, it was held in a summary proceeding, in reliance upon
the Rock Island case, that a reorganization court in New York had power
to issue its process to the receivers in Georgia to compel them to turn over
the property- to the debtor's trustee. In substance this means that, in a
summary proceeding under 77B, the process of the reorganization court
could issue throughout the United States where necessary to protect the
debtor's property. Ostensibly, the court, as in the Rock Island case, was
motivated by a desire to centralize administration and eliminate ancillary
proceedings. 8 Logically, the inference of extraterritorial service of process
to protect a debtor's property from interference in a reorganization pro-
ceeding under Section 77B, from the jurisdictional grant of power over
property, 7 identical with that found in Section 77, was no more difficult
to make than the same inference 'Under Section 77, as made in the Rock
Island case. And this would seem to be so although the fundamental policy
involved in each case is different. The public interest involved in the con-
tinuation of a railroad, a quasi-public corporation, is much greater than in
the continuation of a private commercial corporation. Despite these con-
siderations, however, in a summary proceedhig, whether involving an ordi-
nary commercial or railroad corporation, the necessity of speed and cen-
tralized control to prevent interferences with the debtor's property should
be held to outweigh any argument of convenience, the court's discretionary
power affording protection to the worthy contestant when necessary.
59. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), superseded by Chapter X in 1938, 52 STAT. 883 (1938),
,i U. S. C. A. §§ So-676 (1939).
60. 48 STAT. 912 (1934). "If the petition or answer is so approved, an order of
adjudication in bankruptcy shall not be entered and the court in which such order ap-
proving the petition or answer is erntered shall, during the pendency of the proceedings
under this section, have e:xclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever
located for the purposes of this section, . .
61. See note 8 mupra.
62. See note 24 mipra.
63. See FnLTrIi-R, op. cit. si ~ra note 2, at 562.
64. See In re Prima Co., 93 F. (2d) 952, 958 (C. C. A. 7th, x938).
6 In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734, 737 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert.
dashed: 294 U. S. 725 (1935).
66. In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734, 737 (C. C. A. 2d, x935), cert.
denied, 294 U. S. 725 (1935).
67. See note 6o supra.
68. See note 24 supra.
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Although the decision in the Greyling case was apparently correct,"
fear was expressed that the holding would be extended to allow issuance
of extraterritorial service of process to gain plenary jurisdiction over
adverse claimants, thereby placing an undue burden upon them.70 But this
fear was dispelled in every case but one,7 ' the view being taken that the.
reorganization court in a summary proceeding could issue process outside
its district to prevent interferences with the debtor's property, but could
not issue its process outside its district in proceedings purely in personain,
that is, to gain plenary jurisdiction over adverse claimants.7 2 With respect
to the question of the reorganization court's jurisdiction over adverse
claims, the view was logically taken that Section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act
did apply to a reorganization proceeding under 77B."s
The exception to the contrary, representing an extension beyond the
actual decision of the Greyling case, and by analogy, beyond that of the
Rock Island case, was the Thomas v. Winslow case.1 4 It was a plenary
suit and extraterritorial service of process was permitted upon an adverse
claimant, the court reasoning that a reorganization court may deal "...
without ancillary proceedings in other districts, with debtor's property
wherever situated, whether held adversely or otherwise, if such action is
necessary to effect reorganization, or if failure to take such action would
hinder or make ineffective efforts of debtor and majority of its creditors
to effectuate reorganization." 7 This decision held Section 23 to be inap-
plicable to 77B," the reorganization court having jurisdiction over the
subject-matter as well as over the person of the adverse claimant. As such,
the decision represented an extension far beyond the holding of the Rock
Island case. And as might be expected, the opinion was expressed that if
Section 23 was held to be inapplicable to 77B, and nationwide service of
process was permitted, adverse claimants with a bona fide claim of right
would be unduly burdened in appearing before the reorganization court.7
Such a view as that taken in the Winslow case, inferring nationwide plenary
jurisdiction, with extraterritorial service of process, is not likely to be
widely followed in reorganization under Chapter X "I because of the absence
of an express provision for nationwide service of process as found in Sec-
tion 77,-1 the paucity of public interest involved in the settlement of a dis-
puted claim in the reorganization of a private, commercial corporation, and
in view of the position taken by the courts generally in dealing with adverse
claimants under 77B.'0
69. See Note (1936) 49 HUv. L REv. 797, 8o3.
70. Ibid.
71. Thomas v. Winslow, xi F. Supp. 839 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
72. United States v. Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co., 86 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 9th,
1936) ; and it was held that this'applied also to choses in action in Bovay v. Byllesby,
88 F. (2d) 99o, 992 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) ("It is conceded that a chose in action which
belongs to the debtor is an intangible asset, subject to the control of the bankruptcy
court, but the title to the thing is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the person of
the defendants owing the money who reside in another district and are beyond the ordi-
nary processes of the court."), 65 U. OF CHi. L. Rrv. 139. Contra: Thomas v. Wins-
low, ix F. Supp. 839 (W. D. N. Y. 1935). Criticized in Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J.
568, 569, n. 12.
73. See note 63 supra.
74. Thomas v. Winslow, x F. Supp. 839 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
75. Id. at 840.
76. Id. at 841.
77. See Note (1936) 49 HARV. L. REv. 797, 805.
78. FiNLELMMrE, op. cit. supra note 2, at i82. See note 76 supra.
79. See note 46 supra.
8o. See note 72 .Supra.
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C. Chapter X
In 1938, Section 77B was superseded by Chapter X.?' Similarly to
7713, the reorganization court was granted exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and its property wherever located. 2 This jurisdiction can be exer-
cised summarily over the property in the actual or constructive possession
of the debtor, as well as in the possession of the lienholders, but a plenary
suit is necessary with respect to the recovery of property held under a bona
fide adverse claim. 83  Section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act is expressly
excluded from Chapter X,84 thereby leaving the way open for the reorgan-
ization court to take jurisdiction over the subject-matter of bona fide
adverse claims. However, unless nationwide service of process is per-
mitted,. ancillary proceedings will be necessary in such a plenary suit.8
But, no provision was made for service of process beyond the territorial
limits of the court's jurisdiction. The absence of an express provision in
Chapter X providing for nationwide service of process as found in Sec-
tion 77,s6 is significant of a legislative intent not to include such a power
under Chapter X. It would seem that the inference made in the Rock
Island case, and later in the Greyling case, could be made under the similar
jurisdictional grant of Chapter X."' That is, the inference may be made
from the jurisdictional grant of power that extraterritorial service of process
may be had in a summary proceeding to protect interferences with the
debtor's property. And, if the advantage derived. from the elimination of
ancillary proceedings should be outweighed by the inconvenience and
expense to the contestant, the court in its discretion need not issue the
process. As stated previously, it is unlikely that the view of the Winslow
case, which permitted extraterritorial service of process upon an adverse
claimant in a plenary suit, will be followed under Chapter X. However,
even if the view of the Winslow case is followed in reorganizations under
Chapter X, so as to allow nationwide service of process as expressly granted
under 77, the court so doing will undoubtedly balance the conveniences and
allow process to issue only in those cases in which no great hardship will
be imposed upon the adverse claimant.
D.M.B.
The Bankrupt Surety: His Rights and Liabilities
In a previous issue of the REVIW was discussed the effect upon a
surety of his principal's discharge in bankruptcy.' Of no less interest to
the creditor class is the bankruptcy of the surety. Particular problems are
raised by virtue of the fact that normally the obligation of the surety, using
that term in a general sense to embrace sureties, guarantors and endorsers,
is dependent upon the occurrence of certain factors, such as the maturity of
the obligation and default of the principal, or notice of default in negotiable
instrument cases. In other words, the liability of the surety is contingent,
8r. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 5o-676 (1939).
82. 52 STAT. 884 (1938), ii U. S. C. A. § 511 (i9.39). "Where not inconsistent
with the provisions of this chapter, the court in which a petition is filed shall, for the
purposes of this-chapter, have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property
wherever located."
83. FINL-rrR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 162.
84. 5-2 STAT. 883 (2938), ix U. S. C. A. §5o2 (1939).
85. Frxi.mzR, op. cit. sipra note 2, at 182.
86. See note 46 sitpra.
87. See note 82 stpra.
x. Note (i94x) 89 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 491.
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and the creditors claim for payment against him is dependent upon the
happening of certain operative factors as a prerequisite to liability. The
question arises, then, as to the status of these contingent claims where the
surety has been adjudicated a bankrupt, the effect of which is to discharge
him from all "provable debts".2
The dual importance of the problem is to be noted. While the surety-
secured debt may not yet be due, the creditor of course desires to retain
the protection of the surety. Factually, the surety's liability may not have
yet risen. But to allow the claim to ride through the surety's bankruptcy
until such time as the impeding contingency is removed, and permit the
claim at that time, would be in most cases of little or no avail to the creditor
in view of the depletion of the surety's assets. And from the surety's point
of view, the same would be undesirable as failing to give him a fresh start,
free of all debts-the avowed spirit of the Bankruptcy Act.3 Moreover,
to allow the claim to remain outstanding, and thus afford the creditor an
opportunity to seize upon after-acquired assets of the rehabilitated surety,
is to prefer this creditor over other general creditors, a status which can
find no justification whatsoever from the merits of the situation. Hence,
reason would seem to dictate the allowance of proof of these contingent
claims.
History is relevant to the discussion. The early Bankruptcy Acts of
z84I 1 and 1867 1 both provided for the proof by a creditor of his contingent
claim against a surety in the latter's bankruptcy proceedings, and hence the
bankruptcy of a surety prior to the maturity of a debt did not deprive the
creditor of this security. The next Bankruptcy Act, in 1898, made no pro-
vision for proof of contingent claims, which omission led to a divergence of
opinion on the subject. Early cases under the rew Act followed the lead
of decisions under the previous Acts and sustained provability. 6 The con-
trary view, as expressed some 26 years thereafter argued that, by changing
the provisions of the Act and .now ignoring contingent claims, it was the
legislative intent to deny the provability of contingent claims. This conflict
was resolved in favor of provability by the Supreme Court in the famous
case of Maynard v. Elliott 8 in 1931. There, the batmrupts were endorsers
of promissoiy notes payable to petitioners, falling due subsequent to the
period within which a proof may be made. The Circuit Court of Appeals I
held that the claims were not provable because contingent-none of the
notes was due at the time of the petition, and there had been no waiver of
presentment or notice of dishonor. This was repudiated by the Supreme
Court, which had granted certiorari in order to settle the conflict bttween
the lower federal courts. Section 63a (4) of the Act of i898,10 allowing
proof of a claim founded upon a contract, express or implied, was held
"broad enough to embrace the liability of an endorser upon negotiable paper
2. Bankruptcy Act of iW8, § 17, 52 STAr. 851, '1 U. S. C. A. § 35 (940 Supp.).
3. Williams v. United States Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554 (1915).
4. 5 STAT. 440 (1841).
L- 14 STAT. 517 (1867).
6. Moch v. Market St. Nat. Bank, 1o7 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o) ; In re Sem-
mer Glass Co., 135 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2d, io5) ; see .Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U. S. 273,
276 (1931); Note (931) 31 COL I REv. 1348.
7. First Natkllal Bank v. Elliott, i9 F. (:d) 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; Elliott v.
Maynard, 40 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 6th, 193o); see Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U. S. 273,
276 (1931) ; 2 COLLIMR ON BANKRUPTCY (13th ed. 1923) i42o, n. 257.
8.283 U. S. 273 (xj31), 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 124, 30 MIcr. L R-rv. 614, x
MixN. L REY. 8x6, i8 VA. L. REv. 178.
9. Elliott v. Maynard, 40 F. (2d) x7 (C. C. A. 6th, 193o).
zo. 3o STAr. 562 (28,,), xx U. S. C. A. § zo3a (Y934).
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which has not matured at tfie time of the adjudication."1' 1  The Court
expressly refused to read into Section 63a (4) the limitation in Section
63a. (i) that the claim must be absolutely owing, as had been urged by the
appellees.
The rule of Maynard v. Elliott was incorporated in the Chandler Act
of 1938 in Section 63a: 12 "Debts of the bankfupt may be proved and
allowed against his estate which are founded upon . . . (8) contingent
debts and contingent contractual liabilities; . . ." Thus today there is
no question as to the provability of claims against a surety regardless of
maturity date and other contingencies, and resort need no longer be had
to the implied contract theory as used under the old Act. And since the
contingent claim is a provable one, the surety's discharge in bankruptcy is
a good defense upon an action on a note at its subsequent maturity. 8
One limitation was imposed by the drafters of the present Act, how-
ever. By Section 63d, contingefit claims proved but disallowed under Sec-
tion 57d, shall be deemed not provable Section 57d 4 provides "That an
unliquidated or contingent claim shall not be allowed unless liquidated or
the amount thereof estimated in the manner and within the time directed
by the court; and such claim shall not be allowed if the court shall deter-
mine that it is not capable of liquidation or of reasonable estimation or that
such liquidation or estimation would unduly delay the administration of the
estate or any proceeding under this Act." While this section would appear
but rarely applicable to suretyship cases since the amount due will normally
be a sum certain at the time of bankruptcy,15 if it should be brought into,
operation, the creditor's claim, being deemed now not provable, would ride
through the surety's bankruptcy and remain as an outstanding obligation
after his discharge.
Not only has the contingent claimant a claim provable against the
surety's estate; he is considered a "creditor" within the meaning of Section
3,1" so that a conveyance by an insolvent surety constitutes an act of bank-
ruptcy as to the obligee of the surety contract, enabling such obligee to file
a petition to have the surety adjudged a bankrupt?
Of course, where a claim against a surety is thus proved against his
bankrupt estate, this has no effect upon the liability of the principal debtor u
and the latter may still feel constrained to pay his obligation at the subse-
quent maturity date. It is to be expected that this would relieve the surety's
estate to the extent of the payment, for the creditor should be limited to
recovery of his just claim. It is -true that the status of claims at the time
of the filing of the petition, and not at any subsequent time, fixes the right
of claimants to share in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate. On that
date, the bankrupt's property passes out of his control and into the hands
of the trustee, giving the creditors an equitable interest in the estate? 9 But
ix. Ifaynlard v. Elliott, 283 U. S. 273, 275-6 (r93i).
.2. 52 STAT. 873 (1938), ii U. S. C. A. § o3a (940 Supp.).
1 i. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, § 17, 52 STAT. 85r (1938), ix U. S. C. A. § 35 (i94o
Supp.) ; Hardesty v. YoUng, .34 F. (2d) 3o (D. Minn. xg"=); .cPhee v. United
Sates, 61 Colo. ,121, 174 Pac. 808 (1918) ; Manheim v. Loewe, x85 App. Div. 6or, 173
N. Y. Su'p. 26o (rst Dep't 1913).
174. 52 STAT.-8156 (i933), it U. S. C. A. J93d (xrg4o Supp.).
15. This is particularly characteristic of negotiable instrument cases. However,
where the bankrupt is s,:rety for another on a running lizie of credit, or where he is
surety on a building contract the breach of which gives rise to unascertained and some-
times speculative damages, this Section may well become of frequent use.
16. 52 STAT. 844 (i)33), it U. S. C. A. §2r (1940 Supp.).
17. C. I. T. Corp,"ration v. Sanderson, 49 F. (2d) 937 (F. D. Idaho, i931).
x8. A.ANT, SURETrSHIP (931) 368.
1o. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, §7oa, 52 STAT. 879, it U. S. C. A. § oa (i14o
S':pp.). See Loard of Com'rs v. Hurley, 269 Fed. 92, 94 (C. C. A. 8th, z9og).
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at the same time, these interests are open to adjustment as of that date by
after-occurring equities, such as a payment by the principal debtor prior
or subsequent to the declaration of a dividend.20 Thus where one of several
notes is paid by the maker after a petition is filed against the endorser of
the notes, the obligation on that note is ended and the claim will be
expunged.21 The answer to the argument advanced that the holder's claim
becomes absolutely fixed as of the date of the petition, entitling the claimant
to a dividend, is that such rights must be determined by the contract rights
of the parties as they existed before filing, and are hence subject to dis-
charge by contract rules.22
From this reasoning it follows that any act on the part of the creditor
which operates to discharge the principal debtor w;,ill likewise release the
surety and defeat any claim in the latter's bankrupt estate. 2  The creditor
can have no greater rights against the surety than against the principal.
What may, at first glance, appear a surprising result is reached where
collateral security is given the obligee by the principal debtor. It is fre-
quently said in equity that a creditor having a lien upon two funds must
exhaust that one upon which the other creditors have no lien,2 4 which,
translated into the factual set-up under discussion, would indicate that
where a creditor is secured by both a surcty and collateral, he should be
made to realize upon his collateral first, so as not to deplete the surety's
assets to the injury of the latter's other creditors. But however reasonable
and equitable such a ruling may appear, it is clearly not the law.23 In deny-
ing application of this equitable principle to bankrupt surety cases, the
courts invoke a strict application of the Act. Section I (28)"1 defines a
secured creditor as one who has security for his debt "upon the property
of the bankrupt". In the instant situation it is the property of the principal
which is held, not that of the bankrupt surety. Hence the security does not
inure to the advantage of the surety under Section 57h,2 7 which would
deduct the amount of such collateral from the creditor's claim against the
surety; 28 but rather the creditor retains his full claim upon both. It may be
argued that this is exactly what the creditor had bargained for in demand-
ing his double security. On the other hand, bankruptcy most certainly can
impair the obligation of contracts; and it has been noted above that such
holdings work unfavorably upon the general creditors. Again. the courts
20. Board of Com'rs v. Hurley, x69 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 8th, i9O9) ; In re Levy,
3o Am. Bank. Rep. 9z (S. D. N. Y. 29r3). And see infra note 32.
2t. In re Lindeman, 238 Fed. 639 (S. D. N. Y. 19i6); In re Levy, 3o Am. Bank.
Rep. 9r (S. D. N. Y. 1913).
22. In re Levy, 3o Am. Bank. Rep. 91, 96 (S. D. N. Y. 1913).
23. fatter 3f Orpheum Circuit, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 727 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), aff'd,
97 F. (2d) ioi (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). Bankrupt was a guarantor on a conditional
sales contract of an electric sign. Creditor retook the sign and leased it to a stranger
on its own account, which, by state law, amounted to a rescission of the sale and re-
leased the buyer from further liability. Buyer having -made no payments, creditor filed
claim against the bankrupt guarantor. Held, claim expunged.
24. Familiarly known as the "Marshalling Rule". See CLARK, PSINCIPLES OF
EQUITY (919) § 454; r POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. i919) § 396; 5 id.
§2288; see Gorman v. Wright, T36 Fed. 164. 166 (C. C. A. 4th, 1905).
25. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Jolhiffe, 74 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 2d, To34); In
re Keenan, 5 F. (2d) ioo6 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926) ; Gorman v. Wright, 136 Fed. r64
(C. C. A. 4th, 1905) ; In re Adair Realty and Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 53r (N. D. Ga.
1929) ; In re Thompson, 208 Fed. 207 (E. D. N. Y. 2913) ; 2 COLLIR, oP. cit. supra
note 7 at 2144.
26. 52 STAT. 840 (r038), II U. S. C. A. § 1 (28) (2940 Supp.). This same pro-
vision was Section 1 (23) in the Act of 2898.
27. 52 STAT. 866 (2938), 22r U. S. C. A. § 9311 (r940 Supp.).
2& See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Jolliffe, 74 F. (2d) 247, 249 (C. C. A. 2d,1934).
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have noted the injustice of the rule in pointing out that the surety, if he
had paid the obligation, would have been subrogated to the payee's rights
in the security, and in that direct way, the security is in a sense the
surety's.2 9 Be that as it may, the language of Section x (28) is held by the
courts to be too clear and express to be disregarded.80
This does not mean, of course, that the creditr will be permitted to
realize ioo per cent. on both funds. In no case can he -recover more than
the full amount of his claim. Complete realization from collateral prevents
dividends from the surety's estate; 31 if the collateral is not liquidated until
after bankruptcy dividends are paid, he Nvill receive such dividends pro rata
with the other unsecured creditors, and if, upon liquidation of his collateral,
the amount received from such liquidation, together with the dividends
already received, exceeds the amount of the claim, such excess is said to be
held in trust for the trustee in bankruptcy, whio will then distribute it
among the other creditors.8 2
The surety might have accomplished indirectly what the courts refuse
him directly, however. Payment to the obligee subrogates the surety (and
upon his bankruptcy, the trustee) to the rights of the obligee against the
principal debtor,38 which means that the trustee can realize upon* any col-
lateral security for the benefit of the general creditors.8 '
There is some authority in Pennsylvania which may dictate a contrary
result. In Hinsberger v. Perkionen National Bank,3 the-Superior Court
ruled that a surety acquires no right of subrogation unless he himself dis-
charges all liability of the principal to the obligee; that if he discharges only
a part of the obligation, and the balance is discharged from other sources,
no right of subrogation is raised, even though the creditor's claim against
the principal has been completely satisfied. Unsound as this rule may
seem, 6 if it were to be extended into the field under discussion, even fur-
ther inequities would result. In the event that the claimant were satisfied
partially from the bankrupt surety and partially from collateral pledged by
the principal debtor, this rule would operate to deny any subrogation of the
surety, and in his place the trustee in bankruptcy, so that the bankrupt's
estate would be denied the benefit of the security as indemnity for payment.
The solution lies in the strict limitation or overruling of the Hunsberger
case.
Some litigation has been occasioied by the renewal of notes upon which
the endorser is bankrupt, without his signature and after petition has been
filed against him. Normally, a renewal granted to the maker of a note,
without the consent of an endorser, will release that endorser from all lia-
bility under Section 120 (6) of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,
unless rights are expressly reserved against said endorser.87  But in.bank-
29. Id. at 249.
30. See supra pote 25.
3r. In re Graves, 182 Fed. 443 (D. Vt. 291o).
32. Sce In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 73 F. (2d) 296, 298 (C. C. A.
2d, 8934).
33. Chandler Act § 57i. 52 STAT. 86 (r938), ii U. S. C. A. § o3^ (1940 Supp.).
34. See Note (191) e9 U. oF PA. L. R-W. 49r, 493; St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v. Jolliffe, 74 R. (d) 247, 2.19 (C. C. A. zd, 1935) ; 1, re Thompson, 208 Fed. 207, 2o8
(F. D. N. Y. 1913).
Z,. Tc,. Pa. Super..I.3. -!6.1 At!. 8Z9 ,1933), 47 Hrv. L. REv. 142.
36. Sce criticism of this case in Note (1941) 9 U. OF PA. L. R.. 49t, 498. It is
the only case found rquiring the surety to personally discharge the total obligations as
a prerequi,;ite to st'brog dion. Normally, it is held immaterial who actually discharges
the obligation so !ong as it is in fact wholly satisfied.
37. "S-c. i2o. A -erson st-ccn!arily l5.ble on the instrument is discharged:
6. By zqny ,grcemetit bm.':,,.i uron ti'e holdcer to exte.id the time of payment . . . un-
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ruptcy cases, the courts have adopted a practical and common sense ap-
proach in evading this rule. "It would be, to say the least, embarrassing
from a commercial standpoint, to insist that a holder of a note could not
take a renewal note from the maker when the bankrupt is no longer in a
position to endorse a renewal note. The obligation is still outstanding and
the note still remains unpaid and the claim, therefore, is a real claim for an
unpaid obligation. . . ." Is
The intervention of the petition in bankruptcy is held to be a suffi-
ciently significant act to remove the case from the operation of the release,
and recovery is allowed against the bankrupt endorser.39 Quite obviously
it would be a useless act to demand that the already petitioned endorser
sign the renewal note, and the creditor should most certainly not be forced
to deny an extension of time to a hard pressed debtor for this reason. One
court has even stated that Section 120 (6) of the N. I. L. is satisfied by
proceeding again'st the bankrupt by petition and filing claim, attempting
thereby to make collection, which action is sufficient to indicate a reserva-
tion of rights against the endorser, thus saving those rights within the
meaning of Section 120 (6).4
Furthermore, it would seem plausible to argue that -the bankruptcy of
the endorser constitutes an anticipatory breach of his contract,41 immedi-
ately giving rise to a right of action against him by the holder of the note.
Whichever argument is used to preserve the holder's rights, the result
seems desirable for the purpose of stabilizing commercial transactions.
Akin to the problem just discussed is the interesting situation where
there are several sureties on an obligation, one of whom is bankrupt. The
presence of a co-surety gives rise to another equitable doctrine: that of
contribution, permitting a paying surety to recover from each of his co-
sureties their proportionate liability upon the whole debt-i. e., the amount
which he has been forced to pay for each of the other sureties.' 2 Now when
one co-surety is bankrupt, the question arises as to what claim the surety
who is called upon to pay may prove in the former's estate. On the con-
tribution theory, assuming two co-sureties, one of whom is bankrupt and
the other of whom has paid the whole debt, the paying surety has a claim
against his co-surety for one-half the debt and should be allowed to prove
only for that amount. This result has been reached in at least one juris-
diction," as will be seen.
On the other hand, the only statutory recognition given to this factual
situation in the Chandler Act is that embodied in Section 57 i" giving the
surety the right to subrogate to the creditor's rights upon payment of the
less made with the assent of the party secondarily liable, or unless the right of recourse
against such party is expressly reserved."
38. In re Lindeman, 238 Fed. 639, 64r (S. D. N. Y. i916).
39. In re Warden, 5 F. Supp. 6o6 (fV. D. Va. i934) ; In re Lindeman, 238 Fed.
639 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
40. See In re Warden, 5 F. Supp. 6o6, 6o8 (f. D. Va. 1934).
41. See Chandler Act § 63a (9), 5z STA-r. 873 (1938), i 13. S. C. A. § io3a (9)
(r94o Supp.) : "Debts of the ban'lnpt may be proved and allowed against his estate
which are founded upon . . . (9) claims fhir anticipatory breach of contracts, execu-
tory in whole or in part, . . ..
42. ARA.T, SUREI-YSuIwI (1931) § 75; CL.uic, op. cit. supra note 24, § 452.
43. New Bedford Institute for Savings v. Hathaway, 134 Mass. 69 (r883).
44. 52 STAT. 866 (1938), i U. S. C. A. §93i (194o Supp.): "Whenever a cred-
itor whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured by the individual undertaking of
any person fails to prove and file such claim, such perscn may do so in the creditor's
name and, if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in part, be shall be subrogated
to that extent to the rights of the creditor."
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debt. Application of this theory gives a different result. The creditor had
a right to proceed against the bankrupt co-surety for the entire debt. By
discharging the obligation, the paying surety steps into the creditor's shoes
and can do likewise, proving for the entire debt.' This is the reasoning
adopted by the majority of the courts: 4 6 "One surety who pays the com-
mon debt is entitled to be subrogated to all the rights and remedies of the
creditor, as against his co-sureties, in precisely the same manner as against
the principal debtor.","
However, since this principle is born of equity, equity will be done,
and though proof of the entire debt is allowed, recovery of dividends is lim-
ited to reimbursement of the paying surety's share of the common burden 4 8
-- one-half if there are two co-sureties.
Therein lies the dissent of the minority view. The Massachusetts
court in New Bedford Institute v. Hathaway,'49 argued that since the paying
surety can recover only the amount actually paid by him for his co-surety,
he should only prove that amount; that as between the sureties, each is a
debtor only to the amount of his proportion, regardless of the rights of the
creditor against each, the feeling being that to allow proof of the full claim
would work an injustice upon other creditors of the insolvent surety. In
laying down this rule the court admitted that different results may some-
times result depending upon how the creditor proceeds.50 Thus, "If the
creditor takes full payment from the solvent surety, it will be for the advan-
tage of the estate of the insolvent surety. If, on the other hard, he proceeds
in the first instance against the estate of the insolvent surety, it is for the
advantage of the solvent surety. This result is prbduced by the different
liability which the sureties owe to the creditor, and that which they are
under each to the other, but it affords no reason for enlarging the latter." 51
The Virginia court seized upon this point in repudiating the Massachu-
setts view. In Pace v. Pace -2 the court followed the majority view in
allowing the paying surety to prove the entire debt against the estate of
his co-surety, limiting dividends to a proportional amount. In discussing
the Hathaway case, the court had this to say: OS
"An important, if not vital, objection to the Massachusetts view
of this question is that the rights of the surety, instead of being fixed
45. Ibid.
46. In re Thompson, 3oo Fed. 2J5 (W. D. Pa. 19Z4), xo Co.x. L. Q. 8o, 38 HARV.
L. RFv. 266; Hess's Estate, 69 Pa. 272 (1871); Pace v. Pace, 95 Va. 792,. 3o S. E. 361
(89S); see .foore v. Simms, 257 Fed. 540, 542 (C. C. A. 6th. 1918); Chemical Nat.
Bank v. Armstrong, 59 Fed. 372, 374 If. (C. C. A. 6th, T893) ; Lidderdale v. Robinson,
15 Fed. Caq. 5o2. 5o5-6 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1824), aff'd, 12 Wheat. 5?4 (U. S. z827).
Contra: New Bedford Institute for Savings v. Hathaway, 134 Mass. 69 (i883).
47. Pace v. Pace, 95 Va. 792, 794, 30 S. E. 361, 362 (1898).
48. See note 46 .siprom
49. New Bedford Institute for Savings v. Hathaway, 134 fass. 69 (1883).
5o. To illustrate the different results from the two rules, assume a $200 obligation
on which there are 2 co-sureties, S-i and S-2, S-i being bankrupt, and S-2 having had
to pay the whole obligation to the creditor. Under the majority rule, if S-i's estate
is paying So%, S-2 will prove a $2oo obligation, the total debt, and recover a 5o% divi-
(lend thercon-$oo. lie is thus umade whole, as this is the total amount due from S-i
through his right of- contribution, and as S-2 cannot recover dividends above the amount
actually owira him from S-i--$ro here. Under the minority rule, S-2 would prove
only a $Iico cbllgation, S-s's contributory obligation to him, and would recover 5oo
upon his claim, or only $So.
51. New Bedford Institute for Savings v. tlathaw-ay, 134 Mass. 69, 76 (1883).
52. 95 Va. 792, 3o S. E. 361 (18g8).
r. Id. at 799, 30 S. E. at 364.
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and certain, are made to depend upon accident, or upon the caprice of
the creditor. It encourages a policy of obstruction in administration
oi estates, for if those interested in the insolvent estate can delay its
settlement until the creditor demands his debt from the solvent surety,
they reap the advantage by having a smaller debt to share with them
in its distribution. On the other hand, temptation is held out for a
corresponding effort on the part of the solvent surety to avoid paying
until the creditor has received such dividends as the insolvent estate
will pay, because the amount for which be is liable is thereby reduced.
It gives opportunity to the creditor by collusion or otherwise to further
the interest of one surety at the expense of the just and equal rights
of the co-surety.
"Results like these, which depend, not upon the rights of the par-
ties fixed by law but upon the superior skill of one over the other in
manoeuvering for position, or upon the will and caprice of the creditor,
or upon mere accident, cannot be founded upon sound principles."
This demand for fixed and certain rights has been reiterated in the federal
court.5 4 Furthermore, the "injustice" spoken of by the Massachusetts
court seems of doubtful existence. If the creditor in a double-surety case
chooses to proceed first against the insolvent, recovering dividends upon
the entire debt, the other creditors are in no better a position than where
the co-surety proves for the whole amount. 5  Hence, the majority view
not only appears the only logical solution under express terms of the
Chandler Act through Section 5 7 i, but also it gives a more desirable result.
Finally, it must be kept in mind that there are always extraneous fac-
tors which may enter the picture and alter such results as have been herein
indicated. Thus the ultra vires nature of corporate acts in signing guaran-
ties may defeat a claim against the subsequently bankrupt corporation upon
such undertaking. 8 But such considerations are the result of the normal
criss-crossing of the various legal fields and are not strictly within the scope
of this Note.
W. T. L.
54- See In re Thompson, 3oo Fed. 215, ;27-8 (WV. D. Pa. 1924).
55. See (1924) io CoitN. L. Q. 8o, 83.
s6. See, e. g., In re Marblehead Land Co., 96 F. (2d) 72 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) ; see
In re Amdur Shoe Co., Inc., 13 F. (2d) 147, 149 (D. Mass. 1926).
